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Background: Repeated checking in OCD can be understood from a cognitive 
perspective as the motivated need to achieve certainty about the outcome of a 
potentially risky action, leading to the application of Elevated Evidence Requirements 
(EER) and overuse of subjective criteria. Method: Twenty-four obsessional checkers, 
22 anxious controls, and 26 non-clinical controls were interviewed about and rated 
recent episodes where they felt (a) they needed to check and (b) checked mainly out 
of habit (i.e. not obsessionally). Results: Both subjective and objective criteria were 
rated as significantly more important in obsessional checkers than in controls; 
obsessional checkers also used more criteria overall for the termination of the check, 
and rated more criteria as “extremely important” than the control groups. The 
termination of the check was rated as more effortful for obsessional checkers than for 
the comparison groups. Analysis of the interview data was consistent with the ratings. 
Feelings of “rightness” were associated with the termination of a check for 
obsessional checkers but not for controls. Conclusion: Results were consistent with 
the proposal that the use of “just right feelings” to terminate checking are related to 
EER.  
Keywords: Obsessive compulsive disorder, checking, elevated evidence requirements, 
stopping criteria  
 
Introduction 
Cognitive theories of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) have generated a range 
of research into the phenomenology and psychopathology of this problem (Freeston, 
Rheaume and Ladouceur, 1996;  Rachman, 1997; Salkovskis, 1985, 1999; Rachman, 
2002). One of the key outstanding questions concerns why people with obsessional 
problems have such difficulty in stopping actions such as hand washing and checking, 
on the basis that the occurrence of such behaviour is common in the “normal” 
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population. According to Salkovskis’ cognitive account, difficulties in stopping can 
be accounted for by the way in which people with OCD appraise the consequences of 
the failure to achieve certainty. This can be explained by the affected person’s 
appraisal of their responsibility to ensure that serious harm does not occur, which 
leads them to require unusually stringent criteria for deciding that an action has been 
properly completed (Salkovskis, 1999). It is proposed that this manifests as the 
application of “Elevated Evidence Requirements” (EER) for the decision about 
whether or not an action is complete and can therefore be terminated. The results of a 
previous study examining obsessional washing in OCD were consistent with this 
hypothesis (Wahl, Salkovskis and Cotter, 2008). Obsessional as opposed to non-
obsessional washes were found to involve a greater number of criteria (including a 
range of subjective criteria such as achieving a “just right” feeling) in the decision to 
stop washing. The comparison used in that study was between people with 
obsessional problems in whom the main problem was washing and those in whom the 
obsessional problem took another form. It was not established whether or not the use 
of EER is specific to washing compulsions or is, as hypothesized, also characteristic 
of other types of compulsions. The main objective of the present study is to replicate 
and extend the results of Wahl et al. (2008) in order to determine whether EER is also 
a characteristic of compulsive checking.  
The main competing theory of repeated checking has focused on the idea that 
a cognitive deficit forces obsessional checkers to check repeatedly in order to 
compensate for their cognitive impairment as either intentional or unintentional 
perseveration. The deficits implicated have included visuo-spatial memory 
(Aronowitz et al., 1994; Boone, Ananth, Philpott, Kaur and Djenderedjian, 1991; 
Dirson, Bouvard, Cottraux and Martin, 1995; Tallis, Pratt and Jamani, 1999; 
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Zielinski, Taylor and Juzwin, 1991), memory for action (Rubenstein, Peynircioglu, 
Chambless and Pigott, 1993; Sher, Mann and Frost, 1984) and impairments in the 
ability to shift set (Head, Bolton and Hymas, 1989; Veale, Sahakian, Owen and 
Marks, 1996). A more subtle deficit is suggested by Savage and colleagues who 
propose that deficits in executive functioning may result in the use of counter-
productive organizational strategies and therefore the prolongation of ritualizing 
(Savage et al., 1999, 2000; Savage and Rauch, 2000).  
Moritz, Kloss, Von Eckstaedt and Jelinek (2009) assessed nonverbal and 
verbal memory accuracy and confidence in 43 participants with OCD and a 
comparison group of 46 healthy controls, in an attemp to further examine the 
proposed memory deficit hypothesis. The results of this study showed that there was 
no difference in the performance of participants with OCD and healthy controls. No 
impairments for verbal versus nonverbal and immediate versus delayed memory were 
noted and there were no significant group differences for memory confidence (Moritz 
et al., 2009).  Moritz et al. (2009) acknowledge that, although not found in this study, 
the occurance of difficultites with memory accuracy and confidence, when found, is 
largely mediated by contextual factors (Moritz et al., 2007). Under experimental 
conditions of high responsibility, memory confidence (but not accuracy) was 
significantly decreased in participants with OCD comparable to controls  (Moritz et 
al., 2007; Boschen and Vuksanovic, 2007).  
Other studies have distanced themselves from the idea of a structural cognitive 
impairment and instead emphasized the importance of meta-memory functions such 
as confidence in memory (Ecker and Engelkamp, 1995; McNally, 2000, van den Hout 
and Kindt, 2003a, 2003b, 2004); this view is consistent with the position proposed in 
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the present paper. A number of studies have demonstrated that as a check is repeated a 
decline in memory confidence occurs. van den Hout and Kindt (2003a) conducted a 
series of experiments in which they asked non-clinical participants to check a virtual 
stove and to provide ratings on their memory confidence, vividness and details of the 
virtual stove. Post checking it was found that memory confidence, vividness and 
details all decreased, whilst memory accuracy remained unaffected. A number of 
studies have replicated these findings with other undergraduate populations (Boschen, 
Wilson and Farrell, 2011; Dek, van den Hout, Giele and Engelhard, 2010; Linkovski, 
Kalanthroff, Henik and Anholt, 2013; van den Hout and Kindt, 2004) utilizing real 
objects (e.g. kitchen stoves) (Coles, Radomsky and Horng, 2006; Fowle and Boschen, 
2011; Radomsky, Dugas, Alcolado and Lavoie, 2014; Radomsky, Gilchrist and 
Dussault, 2006) and specifically with OCD patients for whom checking is a primary 
part of their problem (Radomsky et al., 2014).  
A cognitive theory of prolonged ritualizing in OCD (Salkovskis, 1999) draws 
on this latter work, suggesting that not only do obsessional patients have low 
confidence in the performance of a check but also have concerns or doubts about its 
outcome, which motivates them to check over and over again, paradoxically further 
undermining their confidence in that memory. Where memory deficits appear to be 
observed in OCD, these are thus most likely to be a consequence of strategic factors, 
in that the person with OCD is trying too hard to be certain about the outcome of their 
decision (Salkovskis, 1996). Cognitive theory suggests that people with OCD believe 
that they can only be sure when they effortfully achieve an internal feeling of “just 
right”. 
Coles, Frost, Heimberg and Rhéaume (2003) found that the related 
phenomenon of “not just right feelings” was associated with OCD features and 
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perfectionism in an undergraduate sample. They found a strong relationship for “not 
just right feelings” with checking and ordering behaviours. In a further study utilizing 
an undergraduate population significant relationships were found between “not just 
right feelings” and OCD symptoms and theoretical constructs including responsibility 
and incompleteness, but not for non-OCD related constructs (i.e. depressive 
symptoms and social anxiety) (Coles, Heimberg, Frost and Steketee, 2005). Similar 
observations in non-clinical populations have been made by Davey’s group, who have 
linked EER in worriers to the notion of “mood-as-input” and responsibility, 
suggesting synergistic effects (Startup and Davey, 2003). The mood-as-input 
hypothesis proposes that an individual’s decision to either continue or terminate a task 
is based on an interaction between their “stop rules” for the task and the information 
available to them as to whether the goal of the task has been met. It is hypothesized 
that the individual’s concurrent mood is considered as an important source of 
information by which task completion is assessed (e.g. negative mood could be taken 
as evidence that the task in not complete) (Meeten and Davey, 2011).  
Theoretically the outcome of a check is deemed to be much more important to 
an obsessional checker than to others (Salkovskis, 1999); therefore criteria that are 
more likely to be used when one is making a “life or death” decision, may be used by 
obsessional checkers in determining when to stop checking (subjective criteria).  
These criteria are characterized by their reference to internal states of feelings or 
moods, as opposed to criteria based on the perception of external observation 
(objective criteria). The inclusion of EER in cognitive theory suggests that the 
termination of a compulsion requires unusually large numbers of both types of criteria 
to be fulfilled before a decision can be reached, with “just right” feelings central to 
this decision. When applying this theory to compulsive checking, a person who is 
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checking if the door is locked would consider multiple “objective” criteria, such as 
whether they could hear the sound of the bolt “clicking” into place, whether the door 
looks as if it is locked, whether they felt the bolt close, and whether they could push 
the door open. Obsessional checkers may also use multiple “subjective” criteria by 
considering if it now “felt right” or complete to them, if they were completely 
satisfied with the check, if they had any doubts that the check was done, and that their 
mood was consistent with the certainty of a successful outcome. Only if the 
obsessional checker felt satisfied by the answers to these questions would they 
terminate the check. 
All of these factors will, as described above, lead to memory distrust and the 
urge to check more. The present study seeks to extend and refine the methodology 
and content of the previous obsessional washing study conducted by Wahl et al. 
(2008). The “feeling” concept is elaborated by incorporating new items referring to 
the importance of a feeling of “completeness” and “satisfaction”. In the previous 
washing interview study (Wahl et al., 2008) an obsessional control group who had no 
significant washing symptoms was used. A comparable control group for this study 
was not possible, as obsessional patients without any checking problems are 
considerably less common. Checking (to make sure that something is right) is not 
only the most frequent compulsion (Rasmussen and Tsuang, 1986) but can be an 
intrinsic element of compulsive rituals, including washing, ordering and repeating. An 
anxious control group (AC) was therefore included in this study to control for the 
potentially confounding effects of anxiety, depression and patient status. The primary 
hypotheses under investigation are that obsessional checkers will rate “subjective” 
criteria as more important than anxious and non-clinical controls and more criteria 
will be regarded as important by obsessional participants, and that achieving a feeling 
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of “rightness” will be rated as more important for obsessional checkers than for the 
two control groups.  
Additionally, obsessional checkers are expected to employ effortful and 
conscious decision making strategies in order to terminate a check, and that more 
obsessional than non-obsessional individuals will experience a change in mood at the 
end of the check, which influences their decision to stop.  
Finally, at the end of the check, it is expected that the responsibility for 
something bad happening will be higher for obsessional checkers than for the control 
groups, and that obsessional checkers will be less certain about the outcome of their 
check than controls.  
 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-four obsessional checkers (OC), 22 anxious controls (AC) and 26 non-clinical 
controls (NC-C) participated in the study recruited from a specialist Anxiety 
Disorders Clinic. The diagnosis of both clinical groups was based on the Structured 
Clinical Interview for DSM IV (SCID) (First, Spitzer, Gibbon and Williams, 2002). 
Obsessional patients were classified as “obsessional checkers” if they met DSM-IV 
criteria for the checking problem alone, or if checking was their “primary” 
obsessional problem (based on distress, interference with everyday activities, and the 
time spent checking). Potential participants were excluded if they were under 16 or 
over 75 years of age or had a current or previous history of psychotic symptoms. 
Gender ratio, average age, educational achievements, marital and occupational status, 
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the length of the primary problem and current medication for each group are 
displayed in Table 1.  
------------------------------------------ 
Insert table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
Using Chi-squared analysis, there was no difference in the proportion of males 
and females in each group, χ2(2) = 0.611, p = .737, nor was the marital status 
significantly different between groups, χ2(2) = 4.745, p = .093. Occupational status, 
however, was significantly different between groups, χ2(2) = 13.645, p < .001, in the 
non-clinical control group the proportion of employed participants was higher than in 
the two clinical groups (92.3% vs 50% and 47.6% employed or full time education for 
NC-C, OC, and AC respectively). Neither age nor years spent in full time education 
was significantly different between groups, F(2,69) = 0.120, p = .887 for age; F(2, 68) 
= 1.758, p = .180 for years in education. The anxious control group consisted of two 
participants with Panic Disorder (9.1%), eight participants with Panic Disorder with 
Agoraphobia (35.4%), five participants with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (22.7%) 
and seven participants with Social Phobia (31.8%). On average, both clinical groups 
had suffered from their particular problem for a comparable length of time, t(44) = 
1.081, p = .286, with M = 15, SD = 12.4 for Obsessive Checkers, M = 11.5 and SD = 
9.4 for Anxious controls.  
 
Measures 
Standardized questionnaires. The standardized questionnaires used were the 
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI: Beck, Epstein, Brown and Steer, 1988), Beck 
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Depression Inventory (BDI: Beck, Ward, Mendelsohn, Mock and Erbaugh, 1961); 
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI: Spielberger, 1983) and the Obsessive-
Compulsive Inventory (OCI: Foa, Kozak, Salkovskis, Coles and Amir, 1998). 
The Checking Interview. Pilot work on the structure of the checking interview 
indicated a problem in identifying checking behaviours in obsessional checkers and 
checking behaviours in non-clinical controls. Use of OCD specific instructions meant 
that non-clinical controls were not able to identify a check, whilst instructions more 
appropriate to non-clinical controls often failed to pinpoint obsessional behaviour in 
the obsessional group. Slightly different definitions of checking were therefore used 
for checkers and for the two control groups. The definition of a compulsive check for 
the obsessive checkers was: 
This means a situation when you felt driven to check something. This can be in response to an 
intrusion (that is doubts, ideas or a thought like “Something terrible is going to happen if I 
don’t check”) or it may be in direct response to something going wrong. 
 
and the definition of a check for the comparison groups was:  
This means a situation when you actively tried to find out whether something has happened or 
not happened. For example, checking whether the light is switched off, the front door is 
locked, the gas is off, whether you have the keys with you. 
 
Participants were asked to remember in detail an identified recent checking 
experience, with the interviewer prompting them to recall specific details such as 
where they were, who they were with, and how they were feeling to facilitate 
recollection. Participants were asked to imagine exactly what they did when they 
checked and to describe out loud the sequence of the check.  Participants were asked 
to describe how they decided to stop checking on that occasion and what factors 
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influenced their decision. Participants were asked to rate each reason provided on a 0 
(not at all important) to 100 (extremely important) Visual Analogue Scale (VAS). 
Details of the checking behaviour were recorded verbatim. 
The Checking Inventory. The washing inventory developed by Wahl et al. 
(2008) was modified to make it applicable to checking for the purposes of this study. 
Seven items aimed at exploring the use of “subjective” and “objective” criteria were 
added. Participants were asked to indicate the importance of each criterion in deciding 
when to stop checking, and they rated their responses on a VAS from 0 (not at all 
important) to 100 (extremely important).  
Participants were asked to rate objective criteria with regards to how important 
it was that they could “physically” tell that it was OK to stop checking and what the 
“physical information” was composed of (e.g. “How important was it that you could 
see it/ hear it/ feel it by touching it/ smell it?”). Participants were asked to rate 
subjective criteria with reference to the importance of “feeling right” being something 
that they either actively and effortfully tried to achieve or was a consequence of the 
check. Participants were asked if their mood changed during the check and what this 
meant and were asked to rate how anxious they felt at the end of the check. 
Participants were also asked to rate the perceived strategic/effortful nature of the 
decision making process, the perceived responsibility for something bad happening at 
the end of the check, and the perceived certainty of the outcome of the check. The 
test-retest reliability of individual items of this scale has previously been found to be 
in the range of 0.75-0.79 (Wahl et al., 2008).  
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The following composite variables were used in the analysis of the checking 
inventory: 
- Subjective or internally referenced criteria; means of the following 
variables: “feeling right”, “feeling completely satisfied”, “mentally 
struggling with the decision”, “trying hard enough”, “being mentally or 
physically exhausted”. 
- Objective or externally referenced criteria; means of the variables “seeing 
it”, “feel it by touching it”, “hearing it”, and “smelling it”.  
- Overall number of criteria: Each criterion variable (with the exception of 
“How important was it that you could physically tell that it was OK?” and 
“How important was it that you knew from the way that you felt about 
things that they were right or complete?”) was transformed into a binary 
variable. If the original value was zero, the new value was “0”, each value 
greater than zero was “1” in the new variable. The new variable “number 
of criteria” is the sum over these new binary variables and represents the 
total number of criteria being considered. 
- Number of extremely important criteria: Sum of those criteria on the 
checking inventory that had been given a rating of greater than 80. Eighty 
was chosen as representing an extremely high importance (on the basis of 
face validity).  
- “Controlled” processing: Means of the two items “consciously deciding” 
and “with deliberate effort”. 
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Procedure  
Participants were sent a set of questionnaires in the post (BDI, BAI, OCI, RIQ, 
STAIT trait), a checking inventory and two visual analogue scales.  They were given 
written instructions to complete the questionnaires and have the VAS and the 
checking inventory ready for the arranged time when they would be phoned and 
interviewed. For all participants the interview started with a definition of a check as 
described above, and continued by asking participants to recall a specific time in the 
last few days in which they had carried out a check.  Participants were asked how they 
decided to stop checking at that particular time. Once the answers to these open 
questions had been obtained, participants were asked to fill in the checking 
inventories.   
Treatment of data  
Quantitative analyses.  The overall type one error probability was set at 
α=0.05. Mixed-model ANOVA was the main procedure for the parametric data. The 
Tukey Honestly Significant Difference Test (Tukey HSD) was employed for post hoc 
analysis of the parametric procedure when differences between all three groups were 
of interest. Helmert contrasts were used when the difference between the obsessional 
patients and the mean of both control groups was investigated. Kruskal-Wallis and 
Mann-Whitney tests for follow-up analyses were used for non-parametric data. Chi-
square analysis was used to compare frequencies of categories between groups. With 
the exception of Tukey HSD tests, post hoc tests were Bonferroni corrected. 
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Qualitative analyses of the interview data. A content analysis was conducted 
with the main focus on the question: “How did you decide when to stop checking?” 
All classifications and ratings were done without knowing which group the participant 
belonged to.  
The data were reduced using a category system developed for the present 
study with similar reasons given by participants being allocated to a common category 
according to a manual (the category system is available from the authors on request). 
Once all reasons under “How did you decide when to stop checking?” had been 
coded, and the inter-rater reliability established, one rater read through the complete 
interviews again in order to see whether at some point during the interview any other 
reasons for stopping were mentioned or whether the meaning of any of the stopping 
criteria changed when the interview context was taken into account. If any new 
reasons emerged, they were categorized using the above mentioned process. The 
content and frequency of the final categorization were then compared between groups 
using quantitative methods.  
To establish the inter-rater reliability of the category system a second rater, 
who was blind to diagnosis, rated all interviews using the final categories and coding 
rules. The inter-rater reliability was calculated using Cohen’s Kappa coefficient, 
which represents the standardized percentage agreement above that expected by 
chance (Wirtz and Caspar, 1994). The inter-rater agreement for the category system 
was high (Cohen’s Kappa = 0.83). 
 
Categories used 
Each statement responding to the question: “How did you decide when to stop 
checking?” was classified according to the category system described above. The 
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categories were grouped on the basis of whether the decision was predominantly 
based on “objective” (i.e. perceptions of external changes) or “subjective” criteria (i.e. 
referring to some kind of internal state or mood or rule) and on what type of 
“subjective” and “objective” criteria were employed, resulting in four larger 
categories that were of theoretical interest.   
1. External, perception: comprising statements that were based on a sensory 
perception.  
2. Internal, feeling/mood: indication that a general feeling of rightness/ 
completeness, satisfaction, mood or an epistemological sense of “just 
knowing” was considered for the decision to stop checking. 
3. Internal rules, memory: memory related cues determined the end of the check. 
4. Internal, effort: indication that a certain amount of effort had to be put into the 
check. 
Results 
Measures of psychopathology 
A description of the psychopathology measures per group and group comparison 
statistics are given in Table 2. Obsessional checkers and anxious-control participants 
are comparable in terms of measures of depression (BDI) and anxiety (BAI, STAI 
trait); the non-clinical control group has lower scores compared to both clinical 
groups on all of the above measures. The obsessional group reported higher distress in 
terms of measures of obsessionality (OCI total distress) and compulsive checking 
(OCI checking distress subscale) compared to both control groups. Anxious and non-
clinical controls do not differ in terms of overall obsessionality or checking 
symptomatology. An identical pattern emerges for the other OCI distress subscales 
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with the exception of obsessions. The two clinical groups are not different on the OCI 
obsessions subscale but have significantly higher scores than the non-clinical control 
group.  
----------------------------- 
Insert table 2 about here 
----------------------------- 
Checking inventory 
Description of the type and length of the reported check. Participants reported 
performing a variety of recent checks, including checks of doors, windows, oven or 
cookers, gas, lights and other electrical appliances, going over forms and documents 
to see whether there are any mistakes on them and checking whether one has their 
keys and purse. Table 3 summarizes the types of checks per group. Chi-square 
analysis indicated that there were no significant differences in the proportions of types 
of checks between groups, χ2(10) = 5.906, p = .823. Since assumptions of ANOVA 
were violated for the length of the check, a Kruskal-Wallis test and subsequent Mann 
Whitney tests were used. The Kruskal-Wallis test demonstrated a significant 
difference in the length of the check between groups, Kruskal-Wallis χ2(2) = 17.376, 
p <.001; median of 300 s, 36.25 s and 66.67 s for OC, AC, and NC-C, respectively. 
Follow-up Mann Whitney tests showed that the obsessional checkers reported taking 
significantly longer for the check than the non-clinical controls, Z = -3.200, p < .001, 
and the anxious controls, Z = 3.922, p < .001. Non-clinical and anxious controls were 
not significantly different from each other, Z = -0.812, p = .417. 
 
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
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----------------------------- 
Objective and subjective criteria. The criteria were subjected to a mixed 
model ANOVA with type of criterion (subjective vs. objective) as the within subject 
factor and group (Obsessional checkers (OC) vs. anxious controls (AC) vs. non-
clinical controls (NC-C)) as the between subject factor. Means and standard 
deviations per group are shown in Table 4. There was a significant type of criterion 
main effect, F(1,69) = 7.540, p <.01, and a significant effect of group, F(2,69) = 
17.668, p < .001. These effects were modified by a significant interaction between 
type of criterion and group, F(2,69) = 6.419, p <.01. In order to further investigate this 
interaction, Helmert contrasts were used separately for subjective and objective 
criteria. For subjective criteria, the overall comparison between groups was 
significant, F(2,69) = 24.389, p < .025. The difference between obsessional checkers 
and the two control groups was significant, with a mean difference of 32.61, p < .025; 
97.5% confidence interval: 21.84 to 43.37. The difference between the control groups 
was not significant, with a mean difference of -2.385, p = .662. For objective criteria, 
the overall group differences were significant, F(2,69) = 4.358, p <.025. The 
difference between checkers and the two control groups was significant, with a mean 
difference of 12.882, p < .025; 97.5% confidence interval: 1.59 to 24.17, the 
difference between the two control groups was not significant, with a mean difference 
of -7.09, p = .218.  
In summary, obsessional checkers rated subjective criteria as more important 
than the two control groups. They also rated objective criteria as more important than 
the two control groups, although not to the same extent as the subjective criteria.  
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Feeling of rightness 
The variables “feeling right because you actively worked on getting that feeling” and 
“feeling right although you did not try to have that feeling” were subjected to a mixed 
model MANOVA with “type of feeling right” (actively trying to get it vs. not actively 
trying to achieve it) as within subject factor and group (OC vs. AC vs. NC-C) as 
between subjects factor. Table 4 presents means and standard deviations per group. 
There was a main effect of “type of feeling right”, F(1,69) = 11.155, p < .001, and a 
main effect of group, F(2,69) = 9.345, p < .001; the interaction was not significant, 
F(2,69) = 0.768, p = .468. Not actively trying to achieve the feeling of rightness was 
more important for all groups than actively trying to feel right about the check (means 
of 59.14 vs. 39.50). Post hoc Tukey HSD tests indicated that obsessional checkers 
rated both types of feeling right as more important than anxious controls and non-
clinical controls (means of 66.98, 36.94, and 44.04, for OC, AC and NC-C, 
respectively; both ps < .01). The control groups were not significantly different from 
each other, p = .588.  
Obsessional checkers thus rated actively achieving a feeling of “rightness” as 
more important than non-obsessional individuals. However, they also rated the 
importance of not actively trying to feel right as more important than the control 
groups, and the group differences were not different for the two types of using the 
feeling of rightness.  
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---------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
---------------------------- 
Number of criteria being considered 
The variable “number of criteria” was subjected to a one-way ANOVA with group 
(OC vs. AC vs. NC-C) as a between subjects factor. The maximum number of criteria 
that could be considered was 15. There was a significant effect of group, F(2,69) = 
16.879, p < .001. Post hoc Tukey HSD tests demonstrated that checkers used a 
significantly higher number of criteria than both control groups, M = 12.63, SD = 
1.69, M = 9.04, SD = 3.06; M = 9.31, SD = 2.24 for OC, AC and NC-C, respectively; 
ps < .001; the control groups were not significantly different from each other, p = 
.923. 
The number of extremely important criteria were subjected to a one-way 
ANOVA with group (OC vs. AC vs. NC-C) as between subject’s factors. The group 
differences were significant, F(2,67) = 20.793, p < .001. Post hoc Tukey HSD tests 
demonstrated that obsessional checkers rated more criteria as extremely important 
than both control groups, M = 8.46, SD = 2.78; M = 3.50, SD = 2.97; M = 4.05, SD = 
3.01 for OC, AC and NC-C, respectively; ps < .001. Control groups were not 
significantly different from each other, p = .802. 
Consistent with predictions, both the overall number of criteria being 
considered and the number of criteria being regarded as extremely important was 
greater for the obsessional checkers than the other two groups.  
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Effortful processing 
The rating of how effortful the decision was, was subjected to a one-way ANOVA 
with group (OC vs. AC vs. NC-C) as between subjects’ factors. The groups were 
significantly different from each other, F(2,69) = 40.278, p < .001. Post-hoc Tukey 
HSD tests demonstrated that obsessional checkers reported the “stop” decision to be 
more conscious and to require more effort than anxious controls and non-clinical 
controls, M = 74.66, SD = 27.45; M = 23.57, SD = 28.12; M = 13.20, SD = 18.24 for 
OC, AC and NC-C, respectively; ps < .001. Non-clinical and anxious controls were 
not significantly different from each other, p = .337. Obsessive checkers thus rated the 
decision making process as requiring more strategic processing than the control 
groups.  
Mood changes 
Thirteen obsessional checkers (59.1%), six anxious controls (28.6%) and eight non-
clinical controls (36.8%) reported experiencing a mood change that influenced their 
decision to stop the check. Using Chi-square analysis, the proportions of participants 
reporting mood changes were not significantly different between groups, χ2(2) = 
5.161, p < .076. All anxious and non-clinical controls and all but one obsessional 
checker experienced a mood improvement.  
Since the variable “anxiety” was not normally distributed, it was subjected to a 
Kruskal-Wallis analysis with group as a factor (OC vs. AC vs. NC-C). The group 
differences were significant, Kruskal-Wallis χ2(2) = 31.384, p = .001, with medians of 
56.67 (range = 90.0),  2.86 (range = 60.0) and 2.50 (range = 70.0) for OC, AC, and 
NC-C, respectively. Follow-up Mann Whitney tests demonstrated that obsessional 
checkers had higher scores than anxious controls, Z= -4.533, p <.001, and non-clinical 
controls, Z = -4.930, p = .001. There were no significant differences between the two 
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control groups, Z = -0.242, p = .809.  There was thus only a trend for mood changes to 
occur for more obsessional checkers than controls. In line with predictions, 
obsessional checkers are more anxious at the end of the check than non-obsessional 
individuals. 
 
Frequency of self-reported reasons to stop checking 
Each statement identified as a response to the question: “How did you decide when to 
stop checking?” was classified according to the category system as described above. 
Frequencies and percentages of each category separately for each group are displayed 
in Table 5. Categories with significant differences between groups were internal, 
feelings, χ2(2) = 9.389, p < .01, and internal, memory, χ2(2) = 9.143, p <.01. Post hoc 
comparison demonstrated that more obsessional checkers than non-clinical controls 
reported using some kind of internal feeling based criterion, χ2(1) = 8.937, p < .01. 
The differences between obsessional checkers and anxious controls, χ2(1) = 3.978, p 
= .046, and between the two control groups, χ2(1) = 1.373, p = .241, did not reach 
significance allowing for Bonferroni correction. Analysing the individual items 
composing the larger categories, only the category “it feels right” was significantly 
different between groups, χ2(2) = 13.644, p < .01. Follow up analyses demonstrated 
that more obsessional checkers than anxious controls, χ2(1) = 8.693, p < .01, and non-
clinical controls, χ2(1) = 7.989, p <.01, reported using a feeling of “rightness”. 
Anxious and non-clinical controls were not different from each other, χ2(1) = 0.201, p 
= .654.  
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For “internal, memory”, none of the post hoc comparisons reached the stricter 
alpha of p < .01, with χ2(1) = 4.843, p = .028 for OC = AC; χ2(1) = 5.953, p = .015 
for OC=NC-C; and χ2(1) = 1.373, p = 0.241 for AC = NC-C.  
Number of criteria  
The number of reasons participants gave to the question “How did you decide when to 
stop checking?” was counted and subjected to a one-way ANOVA with group (OC vs. 
AC vs. NC-C) as a between subjects factor. Group was significant, F(1,69) = 15.848, 
p < .001. Obsessional checkers reported to use an average of 3.83 reasons (SD = 
1.79), anxious controls an average of 2.05 reasons (SD = 1.13), and non-clinical 
controls an average of 1.92 reasons (SD = 0.89). Multiple comparison tests 
demonstrated that obsessional checkers reported using more criteria than anxious 
controls and non-clinical controls, Tukey HSD, ps < .001. The control groups were 
not different from each other, Tukey HSD, p = .945. Obsessional checkers reported 
using more criteria than the control groups.  
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
---------------------------- 
 
Discussion 
The main objective of this study was to investigate the use of EER by participants 
who have OCD during an “obsessional check” relative to a “non-obsessional” check. 
A comparison was made with both non-clinical and anxious controls. The results are 
consistent with the use of all aspects of EER for the termination of an obsessional 
check: obsessional checkers rated subjective criteria as significantly more important 
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relative to anxious and non-clinical controls. Objective criteria were also rated as 
more important for obsessional checkers than for the two control groups. Obsessional 
checkers reported using more criteria for the termination of the check and rated more 
criteria as “extremely important” than the control groups. The decision making 
process involved in the termination of the check was rated as more effortful by 
checkers than by the comparison groups, and it was also reported by them as taking 
longer. Qualitative analysis of the interview data was consistent with these findings 
for the subjective data. For the obsessional checkers, “feelings” in general and feeling 
of “rightness” in particular were associated with the termination of a check, whereas 
they were not for the control groups. However in the analysis, groups did not differ in 
their perceptions of the use of objective criteria for the termination of a check, 
perhaps reflecting the perceived relative importance. External criteria might have a 
lower salience in the OCD participants mind than subjective criteria, possibly because 
objective criteria are continuously considered during the check whereas subjective 
criteria may be important only for the final decision. If this is so, objective criteria 
would not be so strongly associated with the termination of a check relative to 
subjective criteria, but may still play an important role for the decision, as reflected in 
the importance ratings. Further studies are necessary to clarify the absolute and 
relative importance of objective criteria for an obsessional check. 
This study examined the way in which feelings of “rightness” are employed 
and whether these are conceptually similar to a feeling of anxiety or mood change. It 
appears that obsessional checkers actively try to reach a feeling of “rightness” from 
the beginning, whereas this was not identified as important by non-obsessional 
individuals. Additionally, obsessional checkers reported that it is also more important 
for them than for the controls to feel “right” by the end of the check without actively 
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trying to get this feeling. This suggests that both ways of using the feeling of rightness 
are more important for obsessional checkers, and that the way of employing it is 
unlikely to be a distinct discriminating factor between obsessional checkers and non-
obsessionals.  
The relationship between “feeling of rightness” and anxiety and mood changes 
was explored. There was a trend for mood changes to occur for more obsessional 
checkers than controls, and it is therefore possible that mood changes are associated 
with the feeling of rightness. It has previously been suggested that there may be 
important interactions between mood and the decision to stop (Salkovskis, 1996). 
These concepts are similar to the “mood-as-input” hypothesis used in the context of 
worry (Startup and Davey, 2001). Future studies are required to address this question, 
using a more sensitive measure of mood change. Anxiety, however, was significantly 
higher for obsessional checkers than for controls at the end of the check. Several ways 
in which anxiety and the use of EER are associated are plausible. For example, being 
anxious could be an indicator of the significance of the situation, and therefore 
obsessional checkers could be more likely to use EER. Alternatively, EER could be 
associated with a reduction in anxiety.  
The present study closely matched previous investigations of EER in 
obsessional washers both in form and findings. In a previous interview study (Wahl et 
al., 2008), participants were interviewed about specific situations varying in the 
degree of urgency to wash their hands using questionnaires and a semi-structured 
interview. Washers rated subjective criteria as more important for the termination of 
the washes than non-washing obsessional and non-clinical controls. They also 
identified more subjective criteria in the interviews than controls, for both the most 
and least needed wash. Overall, the findings on stopping criteria are consistent with 
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the cognitive model of OCD (Salkovskis, 1999), which proposes that the use of 
problematic stopping criteria in obsessional patients is motivated by inflated 
appraisals of the threat and responsibility implications of the failure to properly 
complete an action and resolve uncertainty concerning the outcome of one’s own 
behaviour. However, the exact relationship of inappropriate stopping criteria to the 
intrusive thoughts and their long term involvement in the maintenance of the 
obsessional problem, as proposed in the cognitive behavioural model, were not 
addressed in the current study and require further investigation.  
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Table 1. Socio-demographic characteristics 
  Obsessional 
checkers 
(N = 24)  
Anxious 
controls 
(N = 22) 
Non-clinical  
controls 
(N = 26) 
Gender Female: Male 14:10 12:10 17:9 
Age M   (SD) 36.3     (11.3) 37.6   (11.3) 35.9      (13.0) 
Duration of 
disorder in years 
M   (SD) 15        (12.4) 11.5    (9.4) _ 
Years in education M   (SD) 12.2    (14.9) 12.5    (15) 14.8      (15.6) 
Occupationa Employed or full time education 50.0%    (12) 47.6%  (10) 92.3%   (24) 
Not employedb  50.0%    (12) 52.4%  (11) 7.7%     (2) 
Marital status With partner  58.3%    (14)  27.3%  (6) 50.0%   (13) 
Without partnerc  41.7%    (10) 72.7%  (16) 50.0%   (13) 
Medicationc No psychopharmacological drugs 41.7%    (10) 63.6%  (14) 92.3%   (24) 
Antidepressant drugs 54.2%    (13) 27.3%  (6) 7.7         (2) 
Other psychopharmacological drugs  0%          (0) 9.1%    (2)     0%         (0) 
Notes: Cells contain percentage figures and total frequencies in brackets per group or M and SD.  
a For one anxious control participant information about occupational status is missing. 
b Not employed includes unemployed, housewife/houseman or retired. 
c For one obsessional participant information about medication is missing. 
 30      
 
Table 2. Measures of psychopathology  
 OC  
 
AC  
 
N-C C ANOVA  
group effect 
 M           (SD) M         (SD)  M        (SD)  
BDI 21.21      (9.21) 19.18    (11.98) 6.38     (6.18) F(2,69)=18.845**a 
BAI 21.17      (8.97) 22.23    (11.96) 8.27     (8.17) F(2,69)=15.856**a 
STAI, traitc 60.86   (7.41) 57.60    (11.21) 37.54   (11.48)  F(2,67)=36.900**a 
OCI total distress 80.54     (26.32) 30.77    (24.93)     13.31   (16.70) F(2,69)=57.345**b  
OCI checking d 22.88     (7.64)       6.27      (7.82)  2.27    (3.92) F(2,69)=66.803**b  
OCI washing d 10.83     (10.28) 2.32      (3.47)  1.67    (2.58)  F(2,69)=14.658**b 
OCI neutralizing d   9.58     (6.56)       2.68      (2.43)  1.00    (1.55) F(2,69)=29.623**b 
OCI ordering d   9.70     (6.05) 3.86      (4.20)         2.61    (2.93) F(2,69)=16.889**b 
OCI obsessions d 14.88     (6.86) 11.36    (8.25)  3.03    (4.74) F(2,69)=20.790**a 
OCI hoarding d   4.5       (4.02)   1.81    (1.99)  1.65    (2.30) F(2,69)=7.237**b 
OCI doubting d  8.50      (3.15)   2.81    (3.14)  1.50    (2.55) F(2,69)=38.969**b 
Notes:  ** p < .001 
a Post hoc Tukey HSD tests showed that the non-clinical participants had significantly lower scores 
than the two clinical groups (ps < 0.05), the clinical groups did not differ significantly.  
b Post hoc Tukey HSD tests showed that obsessional checkers had significantly higher scores than the 
non-clinical group and the anxious control group (ps < .05), who did not differ significantly from each 
other.  
c For STAI, trait, data of two checkers were incomplete.  
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Table 3. Types and length of checks.  
Type of check Obsessional 
Checkers 
Anxious 
controls 
Non-Clinical 
Controls 
Oven, cooker, gas and 
light 
29.2%    (7) 31.8%   (7) 23.1%    (6) 
Other electrical appliances 4.2%      (1) 4.5%     (1) 0%         (0) 
Doors and windows 45.8%    (11) 50%      (11) 46.2%    (12) 
Papers and documents 12.5%    (3) 9.1%     (2) 11.5%    (3) 
Car doors and lights 8.3%      (2) 4.5%     (1) 11.5%    (3) 
Keys, purse 0%         (0) 0%        (0) 7.7 %     (2) 
Notes:. Cells contain percentages (and total frequencies in brackets) of different checks per group and 
for the length of the reported check the median in seconds per group, range in brackets; N=24, 22 and 
26 for obsessional checkers, anxious and non-clinical controls, respectively. 
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Table 4. Importance of objective and subjective criteria and feeling of rightness on VAS (0 = not at all 
important, 100 = extremely important), means and standard deviations 
 OC AC N-C C 
 M        (SD) M        (SD) M         (SD) 
Objective criteria 48.54   (21.63) 39.20   (22.44) 32.12    (14.70) 
Subjective criteria 68.92   (20.63) 37.50   (19.90) 35.12    (15.76) 
Actively working on getting that feeling 61.67   (40.07) 26.82   (35.90) 30.00    (33.97) 
Not actively trying to get that feeling 72.29   (32.77) 47.05   (37.69) 58.08    (30.76) 
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Table 5. Reasons for stopping a check, frequencies and percentages   
Category OC AC N-C C Total χ2(2) 
External, perception  18  (75%) 24  (92.3%) 20  (90.9%) 62  (86.1%) 3.736 
Internal, feeling  16  (66.7%) 10  (38.5%) 5    (16.1%) 31  (43.1%) 9.389* 
Internal, memory 7   (29.2%) 1    (4.5%) 1    (3.8%) 9    (12.5%) 9.148* 
Internal, effort 5   (20.8%) 0     5    (22.7%) 10  (13.9%) 6.598 
*p < .01 
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